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Abstract
The  paper  looks  at  the  growth  and  investment  performance  of  six  Asian
countries - Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand. Having
discussed the time series properties of the public and private investment series and
the  GDP growth  rate,  the  paper  goes  on  to  use  the  concept  of  Granger-block
causality  in  a  three-variable  VAR  in  the  presence  of  possible  unit  roots.  The
analysis  is  based  on  the  lag-augmented  VAR  concept  developed  by  Toda  and
Yamamoto (1995). We find that no single relationship holds in all countries and that
the  relationship  between  public  and  private  investment  varies  from  country  to
country.
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1.  Introduction
This paper is looking at the diverse growth experiences of a number of Asian
countries  over  the  last  25-30 years,  particularly  at  the role of public  and private
investment in the growth process. Like various existing empirical studies of growth
in developing countries, we examine the relative contribution of public investment
in  development and, in particular, its relation to private investment. Two possible
effects are well known in the literature. Complementarity or crowding-in effect of
public investment is said to occur by increased spending on infrastructure and more
generally public services increasing the returns to private capital and/or reducing the
costs of private investment. The other view regards public investment as a substitute
for  private  investment,  and  posits  that  crowding-out  takes  place  with  public
investment  usurping  scarce  resources  (public  funds,  credit,  etc.)  that  would
otherwise go to the private sector. As a result, public investment harms the private
one  via  taxation,  risk  premia  (if  public  investment  is  funded  through  excessive
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borrowing  and  indebtedness),  or  inflation.  Yet  a  third  view  might  question  the
empirical relevance of either of the above polar views.
The two opposite effects of public services (the one that augments the return to
private investment due to public capital and services and the negative one due to
higher  taxation)  have  been  synthesised  in  an  elegant  theoretical  formulation  by
Barro (1990).1 This analysis yields an optimal rate of expenditure on public services
from the point of view of maximising social welfare. Based on this result, Miller and
Tsoukis (2001) find that in the vast majority of countries world-wide, governments
spending is  at strongly sub-optimal levels.  Not surprisingly,  empirical  support of
both views exists. In the developing economies literature, Sundararajan and Thakur
(1980)  report  no  significant  relationship  between  government  and  private
investment.  Tai  and  Wong  (1982)  report  a  positive,  but  insignificant,  effect  of
government  investment  on  private  investment.  Blejer  and  Khan  (1984)
disaggregated  government  investment  into  infrastructural  and  non-infrastructural
government investment and reported a positive impact of infrastructural government
investment  and  a  negative  impact  of  non-infrastructural  investment  on  private
investment. Pradhan et al. (1990) reported crowding-out for their study of the Indian
economy. Shafiq (1992) also reports a positive impact of infrastructural government
investment  on  private  investment,  a  result  confirmed  by  Greene  and  Villanueva
(1991) when using public investment as ratio of GDP. In the case of Pakistan, Sakr
(1993) reported a positive impact of both total government investment as well  as
infrastructural  investment,  with  non-infrastructural  investment  being  negatively
correlated  to  private  investment.  Finally,  in  terms  of  contribution  to  economic
growth,  Khan  and  Reinhart  (1990)  demonstrate  that  private  investment  is  more
efficient than public investment, but qualify their result by noting that there might be
significant  indirect  benefits  of public  investment.  Similar  results  are obtained by
Khan and Kumar (1997). 
The aim of this  paper  is  to  shed  light  on crowding-in  and -out  by public  of
private investment using time-series since 1971 from a sample of six Asian countries
-  Bangladesh,  India,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Pakistan  and  Thailand.  The  choice  of
countries aims at juxtaposing and comparing the performance of central South Asia
countries that  have seen their living standards rise only very sluggishly in recent
decades, with those of a sample drawn from the more dynamic South East Asian
group. The ultimate objective is, naturally, to relate if possible the emerging patterns
of public investment to diverging growth experiences. As a caveat, the theory of the
second best reminds us that there is no golden rule for government action, which
should depend on specific circumstances. This implies that, in examining empirical
evidence on public and private investment, it should be kept in mind that the results
(crowding-in or -out, etc.) possibly depend on factors specific to the country being
studied - a point made by Kenny and Williams (2001, p.11).
More  specifically,  the  paper  aims  to  study  the  question  through  Granger
causality methods. Crowding-in may obviously be identified with causality running
from public to private investment, with a positive coefficient; crowding-out would
be much the same except that sign should be reversed. Finally, pushed to its logical
1
 Barro’s result has been extended such that public services are generated by flow spending and public
capital, essentially with similar results (see e.g. Tsoukis and Miller, forthcoming). 
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conclusion,  the  sceptical  view  mentioned  above  would  argue  that  government
spending is relatively innocuous and simply caters for the needs of the private sector
generated by private investment itself;  therefore, causality in this case should run
from private to public investment. Apart from bi-directional causality, we also bring
the growth rate for each country into the picture, recognising that both public and
private investment affect the growth rate, but the latter may also be an important
determinant of the investment rates, if it creates the markets, opportunities or needs
for them. Thus, the contribution of this paper is to examine the determinants and
effects  of  public  investment,  particularly  in  relation  to  growth  and  private
investment, in two, arguably quite different, groups of Asian countries. 
2. An Investment and Growth Narrative of Selected Asian Countries2
Looking at  the  public  and  private  investment  rates  of the  six  Asian  counties
summarised in Table 3.1, one trend stands out. Private investment as a percentage of
GDP has increased on average from decade to decade in each of the six counties
under consideration. That having been said, the private investment rates of the three
South-East Asian counties have been much greater than the South Asian counties.
Interestingly, with the exception of Malaysia which has seen government invest at
rates of 12-13% of its GDP in the eighties and nineties, all the other countries seem
to have invested between 7 and 9% of their  GDP in  the public  sector.  The real
difference in the total investment  rates has been due to the private  sector,  where
Pakistan comes out at the bottom of the group both for the entire period and for its
performance  in  the  nineties.  For  both  the  entire  period  and  for  the  nineties  the
cardinal sequence for both total investment rates and private investment rates are the
same,  ranging  from Pakistan  having  invested  the  least  to  Thailand  investing  the
most.  For private investment rates, all countries average their highest rates in the
nineties, with Pakistan investing at just over 9% of GDP, Bangladesh investing at
13% of GDP, India averaging over 14.5%, Indonesia  averaging just over 18.5%,
Malaysia averaging 22.8%, and Thailand leading the group with 27% of its GDP
invested each year on average in the last decade.
In  addition,  the  total  investment  rates  have  also  increased,  on  average,  from
decade  to  decade  in  five  of  six  countries,  with  Pakistan  as  the  only  (marginal)
exception, but the extent of increase has been different. The averages for the nineties
show that in aggregate, Pakistan has invested less as a percentage of its GDP than
any of the other six countries. Looking at South Asia only, Pakistan's average total
investment is just above 16.5 % of GDP in the nineties, which compares with 20%
for Bangladesh and just over 22% for India. South East Asia has had much higher
rates of investment.  In the nineties, for example, Malaysia  averaged over 35% of
GDP, Thailand averaged approximately 36%, and Indonesia averaged over 26% of
GDP in investment.
2
 Gupta(1992) undertakes a similar descriptive analysis in his pioneering work on the subject. 
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Figure 1 : Private and public investment ratios (IP/GDP & IG/GDP) and  GDP
growth rates in selected Asian countries
Not surprisingly the economic growth rates are also much higher with Malaysia
growing at an  average of 8.68% between 1991-96, Indonesia growing at an average
of 7.13%, and Thailand averaging a growth rate of 8.38%. This compares with an
average of 4.9% for Pakistan, 5.13% for India and 4.35 % for Bangladesh over the
same time period. The last years of the same decade saw high negative growth rates
for  South-East  Asia  because  of  the  financial  crisis,  and  the  average  growth  rate
dropped over the entire period as a result. Over 1991-99 Malaysia averaged a real
growth rate of 6.98% , Thailand averaged 4.71% , and Indonesia averaged 3.91%.
Another  interesting  empirical  regularity  seems  to  be  that  over  the  entire  period,
public investment has been more stable, as measured by standard deviation,  than
private investment in all countries except Pakistan.
In Pakistan alone does private investment have a lower standard deviation than
public investment. It has to be said however that this may be just a characteristic of
the time period in question. Pakistan had a much more active private sector in the
sixties which is excluded from this sample, and as can be seen from figure 3.1 the
Pakistani private sector has had a small but consistent upward trend throughout the
last 30 years. The private sector is moving slowly, but the trend is upwards.
The figures in Table 1 point to some other interesting facts.  The eighties saw
total  public investment grow in all cases except Pakistan, where it stayed roughly at
the same level as in the 70's (as % of GDP). In the nineties public investment saw
significant  contraction in  all  counties,  ranging between 1.5-2% of   GDP, except
Thailand which saw a rise of over 1.5% of GDP. In all countries, private investment
grew from decade to decade throughout the last thirty years but the extent of growth
varied widely as indicated earlier. It may be the case that the relationship between
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private  and  public  investment  is  different  across  different  time  periods,  and
econometric estimation may only give us the average effect.
Table 1 :  Trends in Investment and Growth in Selected Asian Countries
Country Time Period GDP  Growth*
(%)
IP/GDP
 (%)
IG/GDP
 (%)
(IG+IP)/GDP
(%)
Pakistan AVG 1971-80 4.81 5.96 9.33 15.29
AVG 1981-90 6.19 7.78 9.17 16.95
AVG 1991-2000 4.18 9.29 7.26 16.54
AVG 1971-2000 5.09 7.68 8.58 16.26
STDEV 1971-2000 2.16 1.56 1.96 2.00
Bangladesh AVG 1971-80 5.92 5.03 4.45 9.48
AVG 1981-90 4.01 11.41 8.10 19.51
AVG 1991-2000 4.76 12.99 6.67 19.66
AVG 1971-2000 4.78 10.15 6.55 16.70
STDEV 1971-2000 2.67 3.74 2.07 5.31
India AVG 71-80 3.06 9.00 7.27 16.27
AVG 81-90 5.87 10.97 9.70 20.67
AVG 91-2000 5.51 14.61 7.53 22.13
AVG 71-2000 4.76 11.42 8.19 19.61
STDEV 71-2000 3.22 2.63 1.43 2.87
Indonesia AVG 1971-80 8.00
AVG 1981-90 5.51 16.05 9.58 25.63
AVG 1991-2000 3.91 18.66 7.87 26.53
AVG 1971-2000 5.87 17.29 8.77 26.06
STDEV 1971-2000 4.34 3.08 1.63 2.43
Malaysia AVG 1971-80 8.30 16.40 8.91 25.31
AVG 1981-90 5.94 17.12 13.41 30.53
AVG 1991-2000 6.98 22.87 12.17 35.03
AVG 1971-2000 7.08 18.80 11.50 30.29
STDEV 1971-2000 4.12 5.63 2.98 6.94
Thailand AVG 1971-80 6.79 17.64 6.57 24.21
AVG 1981-90 7.89 22.69 7.14 29.83
AVG 1991-2000 4.71 27.06 8.96 36.03
AVG 1971-2000 6.59 22.46 7.56 30.02
STDEV 1971-2000 4.44 6.11 1.72 6.49
Source:-  IFC  DiscussionPaper  No.  44.  *The GDP growth  rates  are based on 1995 prices.  These are
obtained by multiplying the 1995 current-price GDP with the GDP volume index (1995=100), from the
IMF's CD-ROM.
3. A Flexible Accelerator Model for Investment
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Our modelling strategy for later use in empirical work is to develop a “flexible
accelerator”  formulation  of  investment.  This  model  was  chosen  because  it  links
investment to demand and output, rather than cost-of-capital measures that are the
focus of neoclassical formulations of investment (such as those based on Tobin’s Q).
Ample empirical evidence now exists that that stresses the primacy of demand and
sales  variables  rather  than  cost-of-capital  arguments  (see  Chirinko,  1993).  This
evidence is even stronger for developing countries (Sakr, 1993; among others). A
theoretically justifiable construction of the ‘flexible accelerator model’ for private
investment has been successfully attempted by various authors,  along a generally
similar pattern (see Wai and Wong, 1982; Blejer and Khan, 1984; Mavrotas ,1997
among others). In this section a general model based on these papers is presented.
One of the basic assumptions of this model is that in period t, private sector’s
desired capital stock is proportional to its expected output.
K*t=  a Yet                                                                                                        (1)
where K*t  represents the desired capital stock and Yet is expected output in year t.
Further,  private  investment,  IPt,  is  related  to  capital  stock  by  the  following
equation where Kt is the private capital stock, and δ denotes the proportional rate of
depreciation.
IPt= (Kt –Kt-1) + δ Kt-1                                                                                       (2)
Applying the lag operator, L, we can write:
IPt=  (1-(1-δ L) Kt                                                                                                                                                (3)
Considerations  such  as  availability  of  public  infra-structural  support,  time
required for installing new capital and planning, availability of required manpower,
etc., mean that firms can only partially adjust to the desired long term capital stock.
This  phenomenon  is  introduced into  the  model  through  equation  (4),  where  IP*t
represents desired private investment, and β is the coefficient of adjustment.
IPt -IPt-1=β IP*t -IPt-1)                                                                                          (4)
From the review of literature on private investment in developing economies,
Public Investment (IG) appears to be prime candidate to be included as a possible
determinant of the speed of adjustment  β in the above equation.  Other factors that
are  possible  candidates  could  include  interest  rates,  fiscal  deficits,  aid,  and
macroeconomic uncertainty  (see e.g.  Dixit  and Pindyck,  1994); however,  explicit
treatment  and  incorporation  of  such  variables  would  expand  the  VAR  to
unmanageable proportions and are therefore beyond the scope of the empirical work
presented in this paper. Instead, only include private investment so as to focus on the
crowding-out issue.  So, we assume the speed of adjustment of private investment to
be a simple function of public investment, IG:
β =b1IGt                                                                                                            (5)
b1  is  directly  related  to  our  discussion  on  crowding-in  or  –our:  b1>0  indicates
crowding-in  while  a  negative  sign  suggests  the  IG  is  detrimental  to  private
investment. From equations (3), (4), and (5) we get:
IPt –IPt-1 = b0((1-(1-δ L)K*t –IPt-1) + b1IGt                                                        (6)
From equation (1) and (6) we can then derive the following form:
IPt = ab0(1-(1-δ L)Yet + b1IGt + (1-b0)IPt-1                                                      (7)
The first term of equation (7) reflects the accelerator component of the model,
and is based on private sector output. Many authors use GDP as a proxy for private
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sector  output  because  of  data  problems  in  developing countries  (e.g.,  Blejer  and
Khan, 1984; Sakr, 1993). While Blejer and Khan (1984) uses the expected change in
GDP as the accelerator component, Sakr (1993) argues that actual change in GDP is
as good a proxy for expected change as approximations obtained by using either the
distributed lag model or the adaptive expectations model. Following on from these
arguments the first term is replaced by a constant, INPT, to capture the autonomous
effects (e.g.,  institutional and other factors mentioned above that  remain constant
over the sample period), and actual change in real GDP, to stand in for expected
change  in  private  sector  output.  Finally,  a  time  trend  is  also  added  to  capture
deterministic trends if present. The resulting model can be specified as,
IPt = INPT+θt + b1IGt + b2∆GDPt + b3IPt-1 ,                                                        (8)
where ∆ stands for the difference operator.
4. Time Series Evidence on Investment and Growth Rates
The simple model  of Section 3 relates the dynamics  of private  investment to
public  investment  and  GDP.  While  most  of  Macroeconomic  theory  customarily
treats  government  investment  as exogenous,  the  “General  Theory of Everything”
ought to help explain and endogenise this  variable.  Whilst  Barro’s (1990) model
may be thought as going towards this direction, a standardised framework is as yet
lacking;  but the point remains that  government investment ought to be treated as
endogenous.  Likewise,  the  GDP  growth  rate  is  also  endogenous  to  the  model.
Various  models  would  reinforce  this  suggestion  but,  again,  would  differ  in  the
details.  For  instance,  the  Solow  growth  model  would  tie  down  both  (private)
investment and the rate of growth of output to the exogenous rates of population and
technological  growth in the long run,  but  would otherwise relate investment  and
output  more  closely  for  a  (possibly  considerable)  transitory  period.  Endogenous
growth  theories  would  de-emphasise  (but  not  eliminate)  the  role  of  private
investment in creating output, and would give a more pronounced role to spending
on public services (among which is public investment) as part of the explanation for
the evidently growing Solow residual. The main point is once again the endogeneity
of  the  GDP  growth  rate,  as  is  that  of  the  private  investment  rate.  These  three
variables are directly related to the crowding-in/out question and seem to suggest
themselves as a subset on which VAR analysis can be based so that all variables are
treated initially as endogenous. In order to emphasise the interrelationship between
the growth rate and the public investment rate (the theme of Barro's (1990) work),
we also include these variables in a bi-variate VAR.
Hence, we base empirical work on two- and three-variable VARs, including the
Private and Public Investment, IPY and IGY, respectively; and those together with
the  GDP  growth  rate,  ∆y.   Although  there  are  arguments  for  including  other
conditioning (exogenous) variables in the VAR, the length of the time series of 30
years  requires  a  parsimonious  specification so  as  to  avoid over-parameterisation.
The estimated VARs are then tested for Granger-Block Causality of the included
variables.  In both cases,  a maximum lag of three periods is deemed sufficient  to
capture the dynamics of the system. Before estimation, we examine the statistical
properties of the data. The methodology is the Dickey-Fuller (1979, 1981) one as
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has been extended and standardised over the years. Enders (1995) summarises well
the procedure that should be followed in the case of an unknown Data Generating
Process (DGP), in which case one should start from the most general specification
encompassing  both  drift  and  time  trend,  test  for  the  appropriate  parsimonious
specification and use it for inference.
It is however  generally agreed that  like all  other available unit root tests,  the
ADF test has very low power and often fails to distinguish between unit root and
near unit root processes and between deterministic and stochastic trend, particularly
in small samples like ours.3 In view of this, it is often essential to consider all other
information in addition to the formal tests when deciding about the nature of the
series. In our case, we are concerned with three variables- public and private gross
investment  rates  (as  % of GDP) and GDP growth  rates,  for  which  a  number  of
remarks are important.  It should be remembered that for true unit  root processes
(i.e., not those appearing to be so because of finite samples), shocks are permanent,
so  that  a  unit  root  process  will  not  be  bounded  as  it  grows  by  accumulating
innovations over time.  Both investment  and growth rates (first  differences of the
capital  stock  and  GDP,  respectively,  as  a  percentage  over  GDP)  are  bounded
between 0 and 1, and hence cannot possibly be true unit root process. However, as
both  Jones  (1995)  and  Patterson  (2000)  point  out,  this  does  not  preclude  the
possibility that over a finite interval the process may be characterised by a unit root
process. In other words, investment and growth rates, like interest rates, are among
the variables for which the unit root test results and strong economic intuition are
often in conflict with each other.
Second, it is also important to bear in mind that net investment rates (adjusted for
depreciation), are bound to be different from gross investment rates used here. As
Jones  (1995)  points  out  in  his  examination  of  OECD  countries  investment  and
growth data, net investment may show no persistence at all, while gross investment
is more likely to exhibit evidence of non-stationarity (particularly in view of the low
power  of the  tests).  However,  calculation of  net  investment  is  dependent  on the
assumption of a particular depreciation rate for capital which itself is controversial
as pointed out by Scott (1992) and Jones (1995), therefore we use gross investment
here.  One  should  also  keep  in  mind  that  endogenous  growth  theory  predicts
persistence in growth rates (a large root even if not a unit root), and it would be
surprising to find such evidence for developing countries when similar evidence is
not forthcoming even for developed nations4. In the balance, in seems wise to be
extremely  wary  of  evidence  of  non-stationarity  for  GDP growth  and  investment
rates.
The GDP growth rates appear to be stationary in all but Thailand's case. When
the  auto-correlation  function  of  Thailand's  growth  rate  is  examined  (not  shown
here), it is seen to decay rapidly, and carries a value of only 0.44 on the first lag,
which 
is so far from the value of unity to practically rule out a unit root. So it would
appear that the ADF test is misleading, and all growth rates can easily be considered
I(0).  The  evidence  on  investment  rates  is  mixed.  Following  the  Enders  (1995)
3
 See e.g. Enders (1995), Harris (1995), and Patterson (2000).
4
 See Jones (1995) for results for OECD countries.
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procedure,  alluded  to  above,  indicates  that  only  Pakistan  and  Malaysia  have
stationary  gross  investment  rates  with  the  most  general  application  of (1).  Even
though the inclusion of the deterministic trend appears to be crucial to this result,
that is fully consistent with the recommendation of the Enders (1995) procedure.
Bangladesh, India, and Thailand all appear to have I(1) Gross Private and Public
Investment rates. This evidence is harder to dismiss, especially in light of similar
evidence for one-third of all OECD countries presented by Jones (1995). Indonesia
is not examined because of an insufficiently long data series.
Table 2: ADF Unit Root Tests (Null: Unit Root Exists)
Country Specifi
cation
∆y IPY IGY
Level Diff. Level Diff.
Pakistan Constant -4.1**
(0)
-1.49
(1)
-6.56**
(1)
-1.17
(1)
-3.2**
(0)
Const.  &
Trend
-4.74** (0) -3.91* (1) -6.4**
(1)
-4.3** (1) -3.8**
(0)
Ban’desh Constant -4.27**
(2)
-1.54 (0) -4.8** (0) -2.92*
(1)
-3.7**
(0)
Const.  &
Trend
-4.52**
(2)
-2.2
(0)
-4.69**
(0)
-2.73 (0) -4.13** (1)
India Constant -5.8**
(0)
-1.07 (0) -6.58**
(0)
-1.25 (0) -4.62**
(0)
Const.  &
Trend
-6.20**
(0)
0.23
(2)
-6.4**
(0)
-2.9
(0)
-6.3**
(1)
Malaysia Constant -4.1**
(0)
-2.3
(2)
-3.6**
(2)
-3.1** (1) -3.4**
(0)
Const.  &
Trend
-4.1**
(0)
-3.33*
(2)
-3.5*
(0)
-2.91*
(1)
-3.5*
(2)
Thailand Constant 0.41
(0)
-1.6
(1)
-3.2**
(0)
-2.7
(1)
-3.8** (0)
Const.  &
Trend
0.41
(0)
-1.7
(1)
-3.3*
(0)
-2.8
(1)
-3.7**
(0)
Notes:  ∆y:  GDP  growth  rate,  IPY:  private  investment  rate  (IP/GDP),  IGY:  public  investment  rate
(IG/GDP).  Critical values: 10%= -2.6, 5%=-2.98 (constant included); 10%= -3.2, 5%=-3.59; (constant
and trend included) - source: Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981). SBC selected lag lengths are in brackets. **
and * indicate significance at 5% and 10%, respectively.
5. Estimating VARs in the Presence of Possible Unit Roots
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The preceding analysis delivered a mixed bag of I(0) and I(1) variables: Neither
the  economic  priors  nor  the  empirical  results  are  unanimous,  nor  necessarily
consistent  among  themselves.  Traditional  estimation requires  stationarity  of  data,
and  co-integration  analysis  requires  that  all  variables  be  integrated  of  the  same
order.  Clearly  neither  is  appropriate  in  all  cases.  Fortunately,  a  procedure  is
available  that  bypasses  these  ambiguities.  Toda  and  Yamamoto  (1995)  have
proposed an increasingly used5 method for estimating a VAR in the variable levels
which may or may not be integrated of the same order, whether or not co-integration
is present. They propose that the usual standard methods be applied to measure the
true lag length of the VAR6;  in our case we use the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion
(SBC) . Having thus determined the true lag length  k,  we proceed to estimate the
VAR of the order k+dmax  , where dmax is the maximum suspected order of integration
present  in  any  variable  included  in  the  VAR.  We  can  now proceed  to  use  the
standard asymptotic theory to test general restrictions on the coefficients of the first
k lags. The coefficients on the last dmax lags are ignored.7 This methodology is used
to test for Granger block non-causality in the three-variable VAR, including both
private and public investment as a ratio of GDP, and the GDP growth rate. 
Based on the results presented in Table 2, the maximum possible order of any
series is 1. The optimal lag of the VAR,  k, is selected using SBC and the VAR is
then estimated for (k+1) order. The restrictions are tested on the coefficients on the
first k lags. In order to test for crowding-in/out in its strictest sense, Table 3 presents
the results of causality tests based on the bi-variate VARs (IGY and IPY), using the
Toda  and  Yamamoto  (1995)  methodology;  while,  to  relate  investment  rates  to
growth, Table 4 presents those based on tri-variate VARs (IGY, IPY and ∆y). In all
cases, wherever there is statistically significant causation, a sign indicates whether
the causal effect is an increase or decrease.  
Table 3 : Summary of bi-variate Granger -Causality testing in the presence of
possible unit roots in the series
Country
 ♦ From IGY to IPY  ♦From IPY to IGY
F-test Causal F-test Causal
Pakistan 6.03
[.008]
Yes
(+)
0.28
[0.75]
No
Bangladesh 0.56
[0.46]
No 3.68
[0.06]
Yes
(+)
India 0.39
[.536]
No 0.12
[0.72]
No
Malaysia 0.0003
[0.99]
No 1.18
[0.28]
No
Thailand 3.74
[.065]
Yes
(+)
2.97
[0.09]
Yes
(-)
Note:  p-values  are  reported  in  parentheses.  ♦ indicates  the  use  of  Toda  and  Yamamoto's  (1995)
methodology. The definitions of the variables are as they appear in Table 2. 
5
 See Dolado and Lutkepohl (1996), Shan and Sun (1998),  and Naka and Tufte (1997) and Abala-
Bertrand and Mamatzakis (2001) for examples.
6
 See Urbain (1989) for discussion.
7
 Dolado and Lutkepohl (1996) proceed to use this method and use Wald Tests to test for restrictions.
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As can  be  seen from Tables  3  and  4,  only  three  of  the  five  countries  show
evidence of any kind of causality, Pakistan and Thailand being the most important
cases in point. Crowding-in of private by public investment appears to be the case in
Pakistan, while on balance the evidence appears to show crowding-out in Thailand.
In Bangladesh, public sector investment seems to follow, rather than lead, private
sector  investment  which  may  actually  indicate  that  public  sector  investment  is
undertaken in response to the needs or demand already built up by the private sector.
India and Malaysia show no causality at all.
Table 4 : Summary of Granger Block-Causality testing in the presence of
possible unit roots in the series
Country Optimal
Lags
(SBC)
From IGY&IPY 
to ∆y
From IGY&∆y
to IPY
From IPY&∆y
to IGY
F -test Causatio
n
F -test Causatio
n
F -test Causatio
n
Pakistan 2 1.7
[.187]
No 15.0
[.000]
Yes
(+)
1.97
[.145]
No
Bangladesh 1 1.5
[.251]
No 0.809
[.861]
No 4.02
[.037]
Yes
(+)
India 1 0.42
[0.66]
No .18
[.829]
No 0.93
[.408]
No
Malaysia 1 0.48
[.622]
No 1.06
[.363]
No 0.73
[.493]
No
Thailand 1 1.77
[.196]
No 5.44
[.014]
Yes
(-)
1.9
[.17]
No
Note: p-values in parentheses. Definitions of variables as in Table 2. 
The lack of any results  for India and Malaysia  and the  absence  of any clear
patterns  of  behaviour  in  the  overall  picture  may  reflect  the  need  for  additional
conditioning variables, such as employment, interest rates, etc., which are suggested
by  various  studies  of   flexible-accelerator  model  of  investment  outlined  earlier.
Likewise,  empirical  work on growth suggests  that  a number  of other factors not
captured here, such as institutional structures, the openness of the economies, export
orientation,  and  general  investment  environment,  among  others,  are  reputed  to
distinguish  the South Asian economies  from the  South East  Asian economies  in
various studies, and may explain their superior investment and growth performance.
While these additional conditioning variables may actually help explain growth or
private investment, there are two main reasons why they were not included. First,
given the sample size, the risk of  over-parameterisation of the VAR precludes their
addition.  Second,  theory  is  not  precise  as  to  how exactly  these  factors  mediate
among the 3 variables of interest and affect their interactions, which is the focus of
this paper.
Another, possibly more important explanation for the lack of clear cut results is
the sectoral heterogeneity concealed by aggregate public investment. The effects of
infrastructural  and  non-infrastructural8 components  of  public  investment  may
plausibly be different, with the former usually assumed to crowd private investment
8
 Sakr (1993) defines non-infrastructural investment to consist of investment in the manufacturing and
wholesale and retail trade sectors.
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in and the latter likely to have the opposing crowding-out effect. If the two effects
cancel each other out the average effect may appear non-existent. Work based on
such disaggregation is on the agenda for the future.  Similarly,  one should always
aim to enhance the data by both augmenting the relatively short sample of about 30
annual observations and increasing the sample of countries. Hopefully such work
will  shed  sharper  light  on  the  issues  and  unravel  more  clear  cut  patterns  of
behaviour. 
6. Conclusion
This paper analyses empirically public investment and its relations with private
investment and the growth rate. The focus is mainly on the crowding-in/out issue of
public investment and the relationship if investment (be it public or private) with
growth,  and the sample includes time series for 6 Asian countries (3 from South
Asia and 3 from the Pacific region) for 1971-2000, so as to bring out any common
or  divergent  patterns  of  behaviour  between  groups  of  countries  with  markedly
different growth experiences. The analysis is motivated by a wealth of theoretical
arguments, reviewed in the Introduction, that relate the 3 variables in a variety of
ways.  Empirical  work  proceeds  with  (2-  and  3-variable)  VAR  estimation  and
Granger causality analysis, separately for each country. The empirical results show
that  such  experiences  are  heterogeneous,  as  are  their  time  series  properties.
Importantly,  the evidence on crowding-in/out is mixed, with Pakistan appearing to
be in the "in" category,  while  Thailand is  "out".  The Bangladeshi  case seems to
emphasise  the  endogeneity  of  public  investment.  India  and  Malaysia  show  no
discernible patterns at all. Thus, there is not any single robust complementarity or
substitutability between public and private investment  and relation between these
two and growth rates,  which is  either  common to all  countries in the sample,  or
different in a systematic way between sub-continents,  so as to shed light on why
countries  with  similar  beginnings  have  had  so  remarkably  different  growth
experiences in recent decades. Reasons for the failure of clear cut patterns to emerge
were discussed in the previous Section, as were some extensions for future work.
However tentative,  though, the results in this  paper serve to remind us about  the
complexity of interactions in the real world (which is concealed by the way in cross-
section analyses) and to point out the importance of context-based analysis  in the
form of including other conditioning variables. 
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